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A 1Anit IJiJiory 
Dedicated to every man who wad ever addign-
ed to our unit. 'But above aLL it id dedicated 
to thode who feLl on the Long road to victory. 
Jt id with the hope that thede men will be reman-
bered, not for the war in which they foughf, but for 
a new, Ladting peace for which they died that thid 
book recountd the hidiory of the 254th Jnfantry. 
7his is the story of one regiment; or rather, it is the story of 
~the men of one regiment. Undoubtedly, the world took little 
note of the 254th Infantry. To them we were merely a number, 
a small unit which lost itself in a multitude of small units, a for-
gotten integer in headlines which screamed only of corps and 
armies and theaters of war. 
But to those of us who fought in the regiment, it was the army, 
the theater, the war. When our casualties were high, the war 
was a tough one; when we moved rapidly and the land fell to 
us like wheat before a reaper, the war was going well. 
Our regiment has one hundred and twenty five days of combat 
to its credit. Each of these days could be a saga in itself. Be-
cause of both time and space limitations, it has been necessary 
to deal only with the most important engagements - for the most 
part, those in which the entire regiment participated. 
There are no names in this history. In our records there are 
countless cases of individual acts of heroism. We know that there 
are countless others of which we have no record. In the last 
analysis, no man is more gallant than he who despite a heart 
gripped with fear remained to do the task that was asked of him. 
As this book goes to press, there are only a few of those left 
who helped make the 254th a regiment of which we could be so 
proud. We hope that as you read this book it will bring back, 
in some measure, the days we-the regiment and you-spent 
together. 
Chapte•• 1 
One chapter in the lives of each of us is now complete. That 
episode, whether it marks a prominent or a lowly place in 
our life's story, will be entitled by all "The 254th Infantry Regi-
ment." For a few, it began on the northern bank of the Danube 
River just as we were being pulled off the front line for the last 
time; for another few, it began on the day of activation at Camp 
Blanding, Florida; for the majority of us there was a place, a time 
somewhere between. 
In the early part of 1943, slightly a year after the United States 
had declared war on Germany, the three great leaders of the 
anti-fascist nations gave birth to plans at the Casablanca Confer-
ence for the defeat of the Nazi cancer which was gnawing at 
the democratic organs of the world. Unknowingly, as these men 
released their famous promise to make our enemies "Bleed and 
burn in expiation of their crimes against humanity," they inspired 
the conception of a new United States Division to be known as 
the " Blood and Fire" 63d Infantry Division. 
June 15, 1943, was a hot, sultry day at Camp Blanding, Florida, as 
the entire contingent of men assigned to the 254th Infantry Regi-
ment from the 390th Infantry, 98th 
Infantry Division listened to their 
commander, Brigadier General 
Louis E. Hibbs, promise that the 
new division would someday see 
combat. At this time the unit con-
sisted of 139 officers and 276 
enlisted men commanded by 
Colonel Paul T. Baker, who had 
as his Executive Officer the man 
who was later designated to lead 
the 254th Infantry into combat, 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. 
Warren. 
fhe first two months following the activation of the regiment 
- were days spent in training the cadre and the occasional "fil-
lers" who merely trickled into the organization. 
The first order of movement was to Camp Van Dorn, Mississipi, 
· and was completed four days after its start on August 21, 1943. 
Men began to pour into the unit from reception centers all over 
the country as an intensive training schedule commenced. These 
were the days of life in tar P,aper shacks, lectures on our favor-
ite maneuver, "Build up a base of fire, flank to the right or left," 
of pine sloped hills resounding with the noise of shovels in 
sandy clay and men's laughter, of week-end trips to Baton 
Rouge with their inevitable mile long bus line, of double cho-
colate sundaes atop bottles of 3.2 beer, of K. P. for the lower 
brackets and c.· 0. for the upper brackets, of hurried furloughs 
that never lasted long enough, of Saturday parades which always 
made us too hot or too cold, of cooling showers which we 
dreamed of through the 5, 10, or 25 miles of dust and sweat and 
tired feet, of welcome cries of "Take ten!" accompanied by the 
sound of a hundred matches striking, of two day bivouacs in the 
rain under a leaky shelter half, and of squad runs, squad runs, 
and more squad runs . 
But all was not as carefree as the above paragraph may sound. 
It seemed as if the Regiment was plagued with bad luck. Every-
time a group of men felt as if they had trained together long 
enough to make a good combat team a new Special Order called 
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for all Pte's and Privates, and many times a good portion of the 
non-coms. Three times the regiment was built to full fighting 
strength; three times it was broken. 
Around August 1, 1944, came the order that we had so long 
awaited, some of us anxiously, some of us apathetically, and some 
of us dreadingly: the alert for overseas movement. The great 
exodus for the train station at McComb began as mass furloughs 
were granted. After our hectic ten days at home, wives, mothers, 
and sweethearts were left in tears at the station as we departed 
with the "this is it" attitude. 
Dame Rumor became the new Commanding Officer as each 
barracks had its quota of those who either "got it straight from 
a guy who practically runs division personnel" or "was just down 
at S-1 when this phone call comes in, see." Around November 
1st, when it was a certainty that we were leaving very soon, the 
camp was divided into two almost equal groups: those who 
knew we were going to Fort Ord, California, and those who 
were positive it would be Camp Kilmer, "Joisy." After stand-
ing an average of three show-down inspections each day, at 
each of which someone managed to lose a shoe string, we board-
ed the train on November 6, 1944. Here most of us learned for 
the first time that we were headed for Camp Shanks, New York. 
Several thousand dollars worth of bets were cancelled between 
the "Ord" and "Kilmer" men. 
Three days later we detrained at our destination. The race be-
gan immediately to make our unit qualified for POE. The world 
became one of seemingly endless inspections, life-boat drill, 
must movies, and last minute range firing. Throughout all of this 
we had only one primary thought, passes. Many of us lived within 
commuting distance of New York City and a portion of our eight-
een hours was spent in traveling between our homes and Grand 
Central Station. Some of us had managed to have our wives stay 
in the City while we remained at this camp. For the rest of us 
there was an endless pilgrimage from one bar to another, from 
one night spot to the next, from show to show with 'occasional 
stops at the Pepsi Cola bar for refreshment prior to another at-
tempt to call home from the Serviceman's Telephone Exchange. 
Two weeks after our arrival at Camp Shanks, we left, carrying 
our duffel bags loaded with complete Gl equipment and a per-
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sonal horde of cigarettes and chocolate bars. A short ride brought 
us to the Brooklyn Army Base, New York Port of Embarkation. 
While on the dock we stuffed ourselves with doughnuts and 
coffee which were served us by the American Red Cross and 
managed to find somewhere among our baggage a place to put 
the gift bag we received. 
As we climbed the gangplank and entered the boat each man 
was shown his stateroom, which consisted of one canvas bunk 
in a room with two hundred other canvas bunks. For most of us 
it was our first ocean voyage and the adventure of being at sea 
helped displace the feeling of homesickness. Our first curiosity, 
that which concerned our boat and its history, was soon satis-
fied. We found that we were on the "M. S Saturnia," a former 
Italian luxury liner which had surrendered , to the British with its 
entire crew. We walked down to the bowels of the ship to pe_er 
at the huge Diesel engine which we w·ere told was the largest 
afloat. 
The sea was fairly calm and the voyage was rather a pleasant 
one. A limited program of calisthenics and training combined 
with an extensive entertainment schedule supplemented the 
many card games we played and 
the books we read. The regi-
mental orchestra gave daily 
shows on the aft deck. It didn't 
take us long to catch the sea-
man's slang and in two days all 
directions were given by port, 
aft, for 'd , bow, and stern. The 
theme song of each show was 
" I Lost My Chow On the Bow." 
Late mornings, late afternoons, 
and late evenings saw the rails 
lined with men viewing the awe 
inspiring scene of tumultuous 
green waves dashing them-
selves against the other ships of 
the convoy silhouetted against 
the dark blue sky. Early mornings, 
afternoons, and evenings, just 
after mess, the rails were also 
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crowded with men viewing the awful scene of tumuituous gre~l"\ 
waves dashing themselves against the green ships of the convoy 
silhouetted against a green sky in a green world . The nights were 
ever heralded by the raucous voice of one of the Italian crew 
members announcing over the loud speaker system, "Atenshione, 
atenshione, light showing starboards, ameed sheeps. " 
Undoubtedly, the most beautiful scene of the entire trip was 
the night of December 6th when we passed through the Straits of 
Gibraltar. To our left we could see a few lights blinking on ,:The 
Rock" itself and the shadow it made from the light of the full 
moon; to our right it seemed as if the entire coastline of Northern 
Africa was a blaze of lights as our ship scurried through the mined 
waters. 
On December 8th, we entered the harbor of one of the most 
beautiful of all port cities - - Marseilles. In the harbor we could 
see the famous Chateau D'lf while our ship nervously plied its 
way through the fifty ships which had been scuttled in the harbor 
by the Germans. 
The following day we disembarked and marched through th'e 
streets of Marseilles to await transportation to whatever destina-
tion was in store for us. Although the town, particularly the water 
front, had ' been heavily bombed and shelled th.e city was in good 
enough shape to see its rare beauty. We marched to an assembly 
point which was just outside the prisoner of war enclosure. Here, 
for the first time, most of us saw caged copies of those we later 
fought. 
As darkness fell we began to feel the extreme cold which an 
icy wind blowing from the north brought with it. By the time the 
trucks finally arrived to take us to Staging Area Number 2, Delta 
Base Section, most of us were willing to label as malevolant pro-
paganda the stories we had heard concerning the "sunny Medi-
terranean climate." As we began our 20 mile march for our first 
overseas location, we wondered if combat could possibly be as 
dangerous and miserable as the truck ride at unbelievable speeds 
along the icy mountain roads which curved toward our new desti-
nation. No matter how cynical had been our expectation of what 
to expect at Staging Area Number 2, all of us were disappointed. 
We found that the installation which bore the splendiferous name 
was nothing more than a bald clay hill with one kitchen shack 
- 5 -
....... ~ ....... 
along the main road approximately every one hundred yards. 
Directly behind them at a distance of about five hundred yards 
was a similar row of latrines; the space between these two types 
of huts was designated as our living quarters. Here we sump-
tuously pitched our tents. 
Although no passes were formally given to any of the members 
of the regiment, it took no time at all for everyone to learn that 
Mars.eilles and its surrounding towns were within easy hitch-hiking 
distance. Here on passes most of us met our first real French women, 
drank our first French champagne, and gave our first cigarettes 
and chocolate in answer to the pleading children with their "Cig-
arettes pour papa; chocolate pour babe?" We were amazed to 
find that a package of cigarettes would buy almost anything that 
the .average one of us wanted. 
The first defensive action in which the regiment engaged was 
caused by a lone German observation plane which flew over our 
camp about three days after our arrival. In a matter of seconds • 
all of the hundreds of fires which dotted our hill were exting-
uished and men who had always somehow gotten out of digging 
foxholes while in the States began to frantically make a personal 
entrenchment. 
Our stay at Delta Base section was not a long one and we left 
there on December 16 with Camp Oberhoffen, near Bischweiller, 
France, as our destination. We were taken by trucks toward a 
:r::I 3 5.0 "£1 5'"! SL7 L 1 L:::tz: a ~ v-1 
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small railway station ciose to the staging area. As we began to 
leave the trucks some of the more observant men noticed the fa -
mous "40 and 8" railroad box cars. They pointed them o•Jt as the 
quaint conveyances upon which our fathers had ridden in the last 
world war. Originally designed around 1900, they were supposed 
to hold 40 men and 8 horses. All of us laughed and wondered 
how either 8 horses or 40 men could be put in these tiny, ridicu-
lous looking vehicles. We were not laughing nearly so hard a few 
minutes later when we learned that we were going to take a four 
day trip in these cars. Twenty-five men in each made for slightly 
crowded conditions, but it ·increased the much needed warmth 
considerably, there being no method of heating the boxcar. 
Amazingly, we found that the trip was much more enjoyable than 
we would ever have anticipated. The large sliding doors made it 
possible for almost everyone to see the country through which we 
were traveling. Numerous stops made it ~imple to attain bottles 
of champagne in exchange for a pack or two of cigarettes. The 
most notable towns we passed through were Lyon, Dijon, Epinal, 
and Saarburg. Throughout France we found, however, that many 
buildings, factories, roads, and bridges were destroyed beyond 
any chance of repair or salvage. This gave us our first sight 
of the true effects of war and many of us vowed that the Germans 
would pay for the des-
truction they had so wantonly 
wrought throughout the country 
of this almost prostrate ally of 
ours. We reached Camp Ober-
hoffen on December 20th after 
a truck ride from Saarburg, 
where the railroad ended. Ober-
hoffen, which translated in Eng-
lish means "Always Hope," was 
an old Napoleanic cavalry camp 
which had been used by both 
the French and Germans, in va-
rious stages of history, for over 
200 years. 
When we first heard that Camp 
Oberhoffen had been taken 
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only six days before our arrival we felt almost like veterans. 
At this time we were part of Task Force Harris, which consisted 
of three Infantry Regiments of the 63d Division and a Division 
Headquarters detachment. The first field order which was issued 
ordered us to duty with the 7th Army, and prepared us for 
early patrolling of the Rhine River near Strasbourg, France. Our 
first alert was given in the form of a message from G-2 at 2215 
on December 23, 1944. It read, "Be on the alert for enemy para-
troopers. Number dropped during recent alert between 2100 and 
2130. Paratroopers probably in American uniform. Be careful of 
future drops during night." Although several of us while stand-
ing guard imagined the silky white umbrella shaped objects 
falling toward us in the moonless night, there was never any 
great reason to suspect that parachutists were dropped in our 
area. 
December 24th came and went as most every other day, with 
a full training schedule; only the quietness of all those around 
us reminded us that it was Christmas Eve. The following day, 
after a delicious turkey dinner, we received our second mail 
call since being overseas. This, combined with a post exchange 
ration, boosted our morale from its probable lowest ebb. 
The orders for our attachment to another unit came on De-
cember 28th, announcing that effective the 27th, the 254th In-
fantry was attached to the 3d Infantry Division, First French 
Army, VI Army Group for active duty. 
The next day the movement began toward the area which 
surrounds Ville, France. Just a trifle over a year and a half after 
the regiment had been activated, it was moving toward the 
mission it had always known that it would someday fulfill -
combat with the enemy on his own ground . 
- 8 -
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0 n the first day of the first month of 1945, the free people of the world together prayed that this year might end the great 
slaughter of the war in Europe. For them it was a new dawn of 
hope, of faith, and of rededication to the task that lay before 
them. 
For the 254th Infantry, too, January the first was a day different 
from all others : for most of us it was our first day of combat. 
We did not go into battle as a regiment, but rather as battalions 
and companies attached to units of our foster parent, the Th i rd 
Infantry Division. Whether we were in the group attached to the 
30th Infantry in the vicinity of Kaysersberg (our First Battalion, 
Antitank Company, and I & R Platoon), or in the group attached 
to the 7th Infantry in the vicinity of Lapoutrois (our Second Bat-
talion with Service and Cannon Companies) , or in the group 
attached to the 15th Infantry in the vicinity of Bergheim (our 
Third Battalion and Regimental Headquarters), all of us had much 
the ,same reaction as we moved toward the front line to relieve 
those on the defensive. 
Many of us were a5similating what we had been told about 
our mission. We were about to be engaged in one of the most 
o i tter campaigns of the entire War in Europe : the Colmar Pocket. 
The First French Army, under the command of General d 'A rmee 
Laitre d 'Tassigney, had compressed the enemy in that part of 
the Vosges Mountains surrounding the French city of Colmar 
until the German lines had become a virtual ring of steel engulfing 
it, the adjacent towns, the juncture of the Rhine-Rhone Canal, 
and all that territory east to the Rhine River. At this time, the 
Nazis were emplaced in all the most strateg ic positions this 
mountain studded region afforded ; in addition to thi s, they had 
ample supplies of men and materiel , including much armor, to 
indefini tely hold this gro und . 
' 
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-fk::-·-c-ct-' ·:::o:;~ At twilight we began our march 
toward the front in order to effect 
our assigned relief under the 
cover of darkness; involuntarily 
the pace quickened as if our feet 
were attempting to keep step 
with our fast beating hearts, We 
were three thousand; our thoughts 
were a million_ Homes, families, 
wives, conversations, books, feet, 
and guns ran through our minds 
singly or simultaneously, While 
one of us thought of his wife, 
another recalled a passage from 
All Quiet on the Western Front. 
Yet each of us had two things in 
common: a question and a certitude_ We wondered how we would 
react in combat; we knew we were scared. 
An old sol<;fier would have recognized us instantly as what we 
were: a fresh, green outfit "going up" for the first time. But a 
veteran wou)d not have laughed at us just as later we never 
laughed at the uninitiated. We were about to learn something that 
each man must experience for himself. Combat defies description. 
No man can impart to another what it is really like. 
Slowly 'the light ebbed until there was only the dark and the 
cold and a fragment of a moon_ We talked in whispers as our 
stomachs began to feel like bottomless pits mounted on legs of 
rubber. • Occasionally someone would attempt a joke such as 
"Man, my foxhole's gonna be so damn deep they ' ll have to gimme 
a campaign ribbon for the CBI !" These were met either by silence 
punctu.ated only with the sound of heavy boots automatically ris-
ing and falling on packed snow or by low, mirthless laughter 
which lasted too long. 
We watched, our eyes hypnotized, as for the first time we saw 
in the distance the reddish burst of flame as big guns sent hun-
dreds of pounds of explosive into the night, the blinding flash of 
phosphorus with its flaming fingers probing skyward, the dazzling 
light of flares which hung in the sky for a few moments lighting a 
- 10 • 
he 
ct 
fi I 
C< 
e : 
hi 
re 
U! 
Si 
rr 
IT 
p 
u 
0 
il 
e 
~ 
I· 
~ 
havoc-wrought, seemingly deserted world, the arched fall of ma-
chine gun tracers looking like red rain blown by a driving wind. 
Sounds - new sounds - assailed our ears, adding to this, our 
first vision of men engaged in mutual destruction. There was the 
constant, patterned monotony of heavy shells rocking the air at 
exact intervals, wearing themselves out as the echo bounced from 
hill to hill; the hissing of high velocity shells ending in a sharp 
report; the fantastic screech of "Screeming Meemies" that made 
us instinctively want to lay on the ground and dig a hole. This we 
saw and heard and felt, and as it filtered through three thousand 
minds there came to each of us a different impression. 
That night a thousand questions were answered and a thousand 
more raised . We discovered how men lived at the front. Command 
Posts were placed in cellars of destructed buildings and those of 
us on line spent our first night in a foxhole. A shell would scream 
overhead and we would fall to the ground hugging the earth as 
if she were our lover. A lifetime would pass until the shell crash-
ed harmlessly hundreds of yards away. 
Then slowly we would rise, dust the snow from our clothes, and 
grin sheepishly at our comrades who were also grinning sheepish-
ly. This continued until, as a last resort to maintain self-respect, 
we paid no att-ention to the shells. Soon one would hit fairly close 
and the whole process would repeat itself again. 
We found that nights on the front are filled with strange noises 
and that no man can trust his eyes. We watched as the first patrol 
left our lines to seek contact with 
the enemy; for hours we strained 
our senses trying to make them 
out as they returned. Every sound 
seemed man-made; a twig crack-
ing was an enemy infiltrating. We 
punished our eyes until the dis-
tant trees began to pass . ammu-
nition to each other, the ruins of 
buildings moved forward on tank 
treads, and the concertina wires 
crawled up with machine guns. 
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" As d ifferent as d ay and night" beca me a gross actuality. We 
found that life during the daylight hours was simple, almost pleas-
ant. Most of us lived in cellars which, although crowded, were 
warm and could be made livable by t he addition of articles sal-
vaged from ruined houses. Canned fruits, vegetables, and even 
meat left by the inhabitants greatly augmented our " 10-in-1 " or 
" C" rations . We were in the heart of the wine country and each 
cellar had its huge casks and bottle racks filled with old and new 
Rhine Wine. Only the outposts were manned. For those not on 
duty there was little to do except eat and sleep. 
At night we fought the war. From twilight until afte r dawn we 
lived in a world of death, destruction, and danger. The night was 
filled with explosives and flares and magnified sounds. We sent 
patrols to infiltrate the enemy lines; the Germans sent patrols to 
enter ours. It became a. gambl ing game with life and death as 
the stake. We saw men die and we realized how thin was the 
thread on which our lives dangled . 
And cont inually we lea rn ed. We could different iate b~tween an 
88 and a 76. We knew when to hit the ground and when it was un-
necessary. We discovered when to lie still and when· to move. 
We could ascertain between the enemy 's machine gun and ours, 
his rifle and ours, his tank engine and ours . We could tell our 
own patrols from his. (Ours made more noise.) We found that 
our enemy was sma rt and that he had good equ ipment. In short, 
we were becoming veterans. 
Not all of our time, however, 
wa s spent on the line. After a 
week or ten days at the front 
we were given two or three days 
rest in one of the shell -scarred 
towns several miles to the rear. 
It was here that we first dis-
covered the "Goums," or French 
Moroccan soldiers . These char-
acters, looking like the back-
ground in a story from the pages 
of " Arabian Nights," were the 
most ferocious fighters and 
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childish men most of us had ever met. One of the most valuable 
possessions of these long-robed soldiers was a fla shlight. Only 
batteries exceeded these instruments in desirability as the tor-
lunate owners of both walked in front of their pack mules testing 
the light every few moments by shining it in their eyes. After 
making sure it worked they would grin broadly, showing rows of 
milk white teeth, and shout the only English expression they knew, 
"0. K., Joe!" 
During these rest periods, too, we learned much from the veter-
ans of the Third Division. They never seemed to mind taking time 
to tell us about something we wished to know. If we became 
seasoned fighters in less time than the average regiment, it was 
probably due to the interest taken in us by this organization. 
We were sent from one sector to another to g ive us as much 
variety of experience as possible. It was also during this period 
that we received a pamphlet sent to "Blood and Fire" by the 
Germans. (see next page) The receipt of this filled us with wrath. 
If the Germans had known the effect of their propaganda, they 
would probably have saved the effort. 
HKLL 216 
At last, after three weeks of mastering the defensive arts, we 
were assigned an offensive mission - we were to take Hill 216. 
Field Order Number 1, issued on January 20, 1945, indicated the 
plans of the Regimental Commander for the seizure of this well 
defended knoll . The First Battalion was designated assault element 
and assigned a thousand yard front extending from a point south 
of Mitt,elwihr, eastward from the easterly power line. The bat-
talion, two companies in a line, was to push forward to the north 
bank of the Weiss River and establish defensive positions from 
the junction of this stream and the power line eastward to the Fecht 
River and thence northward to the highway bridge. An outpost 
line was to be pushed forward from the Weiss River to a distance 
of some thousand yards south of the main disposition while the 
bridge was to be secured by not less than one platoon. 
During this action, the Second Battalion was to continue to 
hold its defensive position facing eastward along the Fecht River. 
The Third Battalion was to stand by in regimental reserve, although 
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Company L was assigned the mission of patroii ing and out-
posting to the front upon the attainment of the Weiss River line. 
Two days before the attack was to be made the First and 
Third Battalions were released from their defensive positions 
and brought to rear areas west of Mittelwihr for training. Here 
those of us in these two units were briefed on the task which 
awaited us. We found on the map that Hill 216 is located south-
west of the Alsatian town of Bennwihr about four miles north of 
Colmar. We knew (some from having been on the line in that 
vicinity) that there were strongly prepared positions on the 
flanks of the hill and a reinforced defensive arc running gen-
erally parallel to the Bennwihr-lngersheim Road. 
Although there was some tension as the time for the attack 
drew nearer, a great deal of this was dissipated as we became 
" armchair strategists." Around each map a group of us would 
gather and a mild discussion would begin; soon, however, fists 
would pound the table as each of us realized that the rest 
of those present had no understanding of what really should be 
done. The endangering of the flank in our planned zone of ad-
vance by the powerfully held German stronghold of Chateau de 
Schoppenwihr became the major argument. Those who believed 
the attack of the 7th Infantry in their zone would command the 
attention of the defenders disputed with the more pessimistic of 
us. All preferred to forget that twice the hill had been unsuc-
cesfully attacked by other units. 
During the early morning hours of January 23rd the First Battalion 
(less C Company in reserve) marched from the assembly area 
near Beblenheim to the line of departure. It was still snowing 
and a bitter north wind seemed to tear unhampered through 
combat pants and layers of sweaters ending in field jackets. 
Our new shoe-pacs were warm but uncomfortable to walk in, 
even on the soft snow; nevertheless we were thankful for them. 
As we wound along the narrow road to the line of departure we 
looked like a "Column of hooded ghosts in our snow capes. 
Company B led the column and proceeded to the eastern half 
of the battalion front; A followed to the western half. At fifteen 
minutes before "H" hour, 0700, the Third Division as well as the 
organizational and attached artillery began firing a preparation. 
We lay in the snow and watched as the big shells flashed against 
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the snow clad hilL As we saw the destruction rained on whatever 
was out there waiting, we remembered what the Third Division 
doughs had told us, "An Infantryman may be the hero to a lot 
of people, but when you're ready to shove off in the attack, the 
artilleryman is the hero's hero." 
Minds and bodies became tense as we awaited the signal to 
move forward. We had seen some of war but always it had been 
we who awaited the enemy in our defensive positions; now it 
~ 
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was his turn to wait in a hole, ours to attack. For the Nth time 
we checked the bolt on our rifle, or adjusted the weight of our 
mortar ammunition, or made sure our K-rat ions were properly 
tied. 
" OK, let's go!" Before we knew it we were moving forward, 
a lot of the tenseness had left us, and we had begun our first 
attack. 
Silently and unseen we moved through the deep snow, our 
capes blending in perfectly with the world of white which sur-
rounded us. For a few moments after we heard the dull ex-
plosions and saw ovr comrades· lying on the ground, we did not 
realize what was happening. No shell scream, no mortar whistle 
accompanied the burst. Then our minds began to work once 
more and we recognized this barrier the crafty Germans had 
erected - a field of the tiny, foot-shearing Schu-mines. The 
heavy snow fall of the preceding days coupled with brisk winds 
had perfectly hidden the mines and the footprints of the soldiers 
who laid them. Together the two companies began to cross the 
minefield, in the only way that a minefield can be crossed - -
slowly, grimly, probing each step before moving, with a foot 
or a leg or a life the penalty for a misstep. 
The explosions of the mines alerted the waiting Germans and 
mortar fire began . to pour into the minefield. This was clearly 
d i rected from the top of the hill and came from weapons in the 
woods south of the Weiss River. The concentration was extre-
mely heavy and B Company began to receive large numbers of 
casualties from this shelling as well as from the Schu-mines. 
As the light became better, machine guns opened up from their 
positions along the road at the base of Hill 216 while snipers on 
the northern slope of the hill aimed their deadly fire on the men 
picking their way through the mine-field. 
Finally, in order to avoid a direct frontal assault on the positions 
at the base of the hill, the company "gave way" to the east and 
started working southward with its left flank about five hundred 
yards west ol' the river. Fire came in increasing intensity from the 
Chateau de Schoppenwihr and from the woods along the Fecht 
River- small arms, machine guns, and 88's. Pinned down by this 
curtain of fire the advance of the company after 0800 was tor-
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tuously slow. So heavy was the resistance and so high the 
casualties that at 1000 it was decided to employ Company C on 
the left flank . 
A Company, on the battalion right flank, was making better 
progress. Although many men fell from the Schu-mines, the mortar 
shells consistently dropped behind the advancing units. As the 
companies neared the top of the hill, machine gun, machine 
pistol, and rifle fire became devastating in its accuracy. Cou rage 
in the face of superio r f ire power coupled with heavy small arms, 
machine gun, and mortar fire poured into the German positions 
on the north slope of the hill forced the enemy to vacate this 
position. By 0900 A had reached the crest, the first platoon in the 
lead, the second in echelon to the left rear, and the third follow-
ing shortly behind. When the units crossed the peak they found 
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enemy dug in on the south slope. Even more intense fire than 
they had received from the north slope met them here as they 
began again to work their way through another thickly sown 
minefield. Direct fire from small arms and machine guns in the 
wooded area south of the Weiss River added to the torrent of 
fire which the determined Germans threw in an effort to halt the 
attack. Casualties mounted as men fell from the explod-
ing shells, the accurate small arms, and the fiendish Schu-mines. 
Nevertheless, the company continued to advance and by 1230 
had reached the east-west road on the southern face of Hill 216. 
Between this position and the river there was an open field, 
undoubtedly mined and swept by direct fire from the woods 
along the Weiss River. Considerably depleted by casualties, the 
company found further advance to be impossible; the unit com-
menced digging in. 
Company C, in reserve at Mittelwihr, was alerted at 1000 and 
by noon the line of depa rture used by the other companies 
earlier in the morning was crossed. Sniper and machine gun fire 
from the Chateau and the woods below it were received almost 
immediately. By the time Company C had worked down to B's 
former position, the latter unit had pushed forward . A group of 
· riflemen had inched toward the machine gun nests and silenced 
the guns; B was moving forward again. As they came to the east-
west road, the second platoon spread to the right to gain contact 
with A while a small group f rom the first platoon, following the 
edge of a vineyard, pushed toward the Weiss River. Contact was 
made with A by B's Second Platoon at 1430. The other platoon 
pulled to the west of the north-south road and using an aband-
oned enemy CP formed a defensive line facing east. The leading 
element of C had not proceeded far along this road before it 
met B's group returning from the river, still under small arms fire. 
C, therefore, built up a defensive line east of the road facing 
the Fecht River. 
At about 1400 it became apparent that the now depleted First 
Battalion without assistance would be unable to reach the Weiss 
River before dark. The Third Battalion, therefore, was alerted and 
moved out at 1650. Only two rifle companies were available to 
that unit for the operation, Company L remaining in regimental 
reserve. In addition, K was short one platoon which had been 
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employed since early morning on the First Battalion ;s left flank 
and was still pinned down by fire from the Chi'lteau. Leaving the 
assembly area near Beblenheim, I and K proceeded along the 
east side of the Bennwihr-lngersheim road between the two 
power lines. The advance of both units was slowed down con-
siderably by a mine field encountered on the approach march. 
Probing their way through this under continued small arms and 
machine gun fire, I Company proceeded, under intense fire from 
the south bank of the Weiss River, to the junction of the eastern 
power line and this stream. Here, after extending eastward, the 
men dug in at about 1900. 
After I had cleared from in front of A, K moved out eastward 
along the road. On turning south the company came under heavy 
machine gun and mortar fire from below the Chateau. Cautiously 
the unit crossed the minefield as the scream of shrapnel coupled 
with the sharp crack of well aimed bullets made the men want to 
leave the single path being probed through the mine studded 
area. With the aid of well placed mortar fire, K reached the Weiss 
river at its junction with the Fecht. Upon arriving at this point, 
-about 2100, the company dep loyed west along the bank toward 
t As K began to dig in, the lack of the detached platoon was 
strongly felt; at midnight a group from Company B was inserted 
between the two Third Battalion companies. 
The night following our first attack came and suddenly all the 
death we had seen, the noise we had heard, the fear we had 
felt descended on us like an avalanche, leaving us only cold and 
wet and exhausted. Our first day of attack was over. Even through 
our tiredness we realized that each of us was a wiser man than 
he had been the day before. We knew that battle was not 
glorious; we knew that our minds had been left with an imprint 
that even time could not fully erase; we knew that we had been 
through something that none of us would ever be able to ade-
quately describe. 
That night both I and K companies were harrassed: I by small 
arms fire from positions across the river east of the bridge, K 
by mortar and machine guns in the woods to the left front. I sent 
a two-squad patrol around its right flank and across the river. 
These men found and assaulted six foxholes. K discovered that the 
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mortar 1lre coming from its front was being directed hom an OP ; 
after placing artillery on this position, the harassment was eli-
minated. 
Only one further action re-
mained for the regiment to 
complete its mission around Hill 
216 - that of "mopping up" the 
west bank of the Fecht River 
down to its junction with the 
Weiss. At 0940 C jumped ofl 
from its defensive position of the 
night before to complete this 
task and to contact the right 
flank of the 7th Infantry just south 
of the Chateau. As C began mov-
ing through the .open fields 
which separated them from the 
thin strip of woods on the west 
bank of the river, heavy fire from 
machine guns and 88's pinned 
the company down about 800 yards from the river. So in-
tense was this fire that it became necessary for friendly artillery 
to lay smoke. With this cover the company was able to gain the 
edge of the narrow strip of woods along the river by 1400. 
Upon completion of this, we had accomplished our first offen-
sive mission. The green of our reputation lost another coat of 
its vanishing brilliance. A new feeling of pride surged through 
us - a pride born of combat - replacing the cold and the fati-
gue. Tested in fire, the regiment proved that it could fight beside 
the veteran units of the famous Third Division. There was never 
a day after Hill 216 that our heads did not rise just a little higher 
when we said, "I'm from the 254th Infantry." 
JJEBSHJEKM 
Slightly before midnight on January 24th, the first elements of 
the 28th Division began arriving to relieve us on position. By noon 
of the following day, the entire regiment was assembled in an 
area in the Colmar Forest northeast of Ostheim. The First Battalion 
- 21 -
--· ~---·· -~ 
was greatly understrength, A having only 120 line troops, B dep-
leted to 80, ·c to about 120, and the machine gun platoons of D 
with less tha"n half of their full strength. The Third Battalion had 
also sustained a large number of casualties, although to a lesser 
degree. Only the Second Battalion remained in good operational 
strength. 
Our stay in the Colmar Forest was destined to be a short one, 
however, for another mission lay ahead of the regiment. The 15th 
Infantry had, the previous day, cleared the area east of the Ill 
River, pushing toward Reidwihr in its southward drive, leaving 
isolated groups of enemy in its wake. The route from the west 
toward the town of Jebsheim was now clear. 
It had become apparent as the month of January drew to a 
close that the hub of resistance, the key, to the entire Colmar 
Pocket was the well fortified town of Jebsheim, France. The vil-
lage itself is laid out in a way highly advantageous to the def-
ender. The principal artery of the town is a north-south street with 
stone buildings on either side. Branching off at both ends of the 
main street are two parallel ones leading west. Weapons located 
in the houses along these streets can effectively cover with cross-
fire almost all the area to the west of the town. 
The Germans had skillfully supplemented Jebsheim's natural 
defensive virtues. Along the street and road leading northwest, 
heavy concrete bunkers had been built. In an arc extending above 
the northwest street, a row of pillboxes defended to the north 
while other steel reinforced emplacements at the southern end 
completed the strong defensive system. 
On the night of January 23, while the attack on Hill 216 was 
still in progress, the tanks and tank destroyers attached to the 
regiment had been released. Now they were attached once more. 
Operation Instruction Number 8 specified that elements of the 
Reconnaissance Company and a platoon of Company C, 601 st 
·Tank Destroyer Battalion were to maintain contact with the 1st 
DMI, follow the Second Battalion, and stand ready to reduce such 
strong points as might be encountered. A light tank platoon of 
Company C, 756th Tank Battalion, was to follow the tank destroy-
ers, protecting the rear and assisting the battalions by fire. The 
chemical mortar platoon and the AAA/AW platoon remained at-
tached as before. 
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So swiftly had come the decision for the regiment to attack 
Jebsheim that when the regimental staff and battalion command-
ers returned from Third Division Headquarters it was already the 
hour set to launch the attack, 1600. There was time for only the 
barest briefing possible to the company commanders . As we 
moved out of the Colmar Forest, most of us knew only that the 
First and Second Battalions were to be employed initially with 
the First Battalion on the right maintaining contact with the 15th 
Infantry driving south below Riedwihr while the Second Battalion 
on the left linked itself with the 1st DMI by reconnaissance ele-
ments. The Third Battalion had been designated as regimental 
reserve, to be used on Third Division order only. 
At 1600 the two battalions moved out, each maintaining a two 
company front - the First on the right side of the northwest road, 
the Second on the left side. We had supposed that the operations 
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of the 15th Infantry insured us an easy approach to the line of 
departure. This proved untrue. Shortly after crossing the Ill River, 
more than fifteen hundred yards short of the line of departure, 
we received fire from machine guns and small arms in the northern 
end of the Bois de Jebsheim as well as heavy artillery from the 
vicinity of Jebsheim. • 
Sub-zero temperature combined with a fierce north wind which 
whipped the deep snow into a frenzy of blinding ice particles 
slowed our advance to a painful crawl as we fought our way through 
artillery and rocket barrages to the line of departure. This was 
reached at about 2100, and already the effect of the cold and 
exertion began to show on us; the First Battalion especially suffer-
ed, their complete lack of sleep and rest for so many hours 
making resistance very low. 
Because of the difficulty which the Blind River presented, our 
formation was changed at the line of departure to a column of 
companies in each battalion. Upon traversing the road west of the 
Blind River, the advance becpme even more difficult under the 
machine gun, rifle, and p istol fire. We found that a detachment of 
French troops had taken the burning buildings of Jebsheim Mills. 
Even though we realized the danger of falling debris, shells 
directed on the Mills, and the perfect outline our bodies made 
against the bright flames, many of us were more than willing to 
take the chance as we huddled for a few minutes as close to the 
fire as possible. This was reportedly one of the coldest nights of 
the entire winter; warmth seemed more important than safety. 
At about 2230, G Company, leading the Second Battalion, cross-
ed the Blind River. With two platoons abreast, one either side of 
the road, the unit moved toward the town. After advancing a few 
hundred yards, the company lost contact with the First Battalion 
on the right and stopped. 
The First Battalion meanwhile was running into difficult obstacles . 
A Company, leading, waded across the icy, swift-flowing river. 
Emerging on the west bank, the company was pinned down by 
accurate heavy machine gun fire. Contact was lost as the men 
of A, soaked from the waist down, crawled through the deep 
snow. Company B inched its way from behind and finally con-
tacted G. 
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Both companies then moved along the northwestern approach 
to the town. After another hour of slow advance, at 2030, the two 
companies came within 400 yards of the outlying bunkers. Here 
they were completely pinned down as fire rained on them from 
three directions: the Bois de Jebsheim to the south, the vicinity 
of Grussenheim to the north, and the bunkers of Jebsheim to the 
east. Mortar fire was placed on the bunkers, but was ineffective; 
a patrol sent southwestward to silence the machine guns in the 
Bois de Jebsheim met with failure as frozen weapons failed to 
work for their frozen owners. So intense was the small arms and 
artillery fire brought to bear on us that even after a fifteen minute 
barrage by four battalions of field artillery, the resistance was 
still so heavy that we could advance no further. At 0430 the two 
leading companies began a withdrawal toward the Blind River. 
The Second Battalion formed a defensive arc around the eastern 
side of Jebsheim Mills while the First Battalion took positions in 
a ditch several yards west of the north-south road. 
Undoubtedly, this night was the most miserable the regiment ever 
experienced. Each man had carried only one blanket into the at-
tack, and most of these had been soaked when we crossed the 
Blind. All of our clothing was wet either from the stream or from 
the snow melted by our body heat as we lay in it. This had now 
frozen to our skin. No fires could be lit. Those of us not on guard 
slept. Somehow, the night finally ended. 
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lhe foilowlng morning we counted our casualties, and met a new 
enemy, one who accounted for five times as many men as the Ger-
mans - the dreaded trenchfoot. Men who could hardly . walk 
hobbled back to aid stations to be evacuated to hospitals. The 
First Battalion suddenly fell to less than company strength. The 
Second Battalion, which had not been committed on Hill 216, 
fared much better, although it, too, had a share of frozen hands 
and trenchfoot. 
Meanwhile, plans were being made to attack Jebsheim again 
that evening. The volume of fire which had come from the Bois 
de Jebsheim indicated that the clearing of this forest would require 
considerable attention. Therefore, while the First and Second Bat-
talions continued their attack on Jebsheim, the Third Battalion 
would pass through Riedwihr and reduce the enemy holding in 
the Bois de Jebsheim. This done, the Third was to advance east-
ward and assist in the taking of Jebsheim by an attack from the 
south. 
It was just getting dark on the evening of January 26 when the 
Third Battalion moved out of Riedwihr. Company I was in the lead 
as the troops crossed the little stream just east of Riedwihr. This 
unit 's mission was to clea r the patch of woods just north of the 
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Riedwihr-Jebsheim road. Company L was to turn off the road to 
the south and clear the upper half of the forest which lay on that 
side; K was to keep to the right of L and sweep the southern half 
of the woods. 
I sent its three rifle platoons forward at 1700, two platoons 
abreast, one to the rear. The two leading platoons came under 
mortar and small arms fire, but were able to reach the eastern 
edge of the woods. The reserve element was fired on and pinned 
down by a well emplaced machine gun at the stream junction to 
the north. Two squads sent to silence the gun were unable to 
close in on the weapon, but it was finally eliminated by mortar 
fire . Defensive positions were then placed along the east edge 
of the woods and -the company remained here that night. 
The attack of L began at 2100. Meeting little resistance, the 
company turned south off the road, then pushed eastward, intend-
ing to advance to the east edge of the forest. However, a large 
clearing in the center of the woods was mistaken, in the darkness, 
for the fields beyond. When the company arrived at this clearing, 
it went into defensive positions. 
K jumped off and pushed due south through the western por-
tion of the forest. The advance was successful until the company 
was within a short distance of the clearing . At this point K en-
countered heavy fire from the southern edge of the woods, mostly 
consisting of high velocity, flat trajectory fire. Unable to proceed, 
the company fell back to Riedwihr, leaving one platoon in defen-
sive positions at the point of farthest advance. 
Meanwhile, the attack on Jebsheim had started at about the 
same time the Third Battalion moved out. The objective remained 
the same - - the northern half of the town to the Second Battalion, 
and the southern half of the town to the First. F passed through 
and led G, which was to protect the left flank. E remained 
as battalion reserve in the defensive positions occupied the night 
before by one of its platoons. Company C, with A followiog, launch-
ed the First Battalion's attack. B, initially to the rear of the other 
companies, was to stand by until they had cleared, then strike the 
southern part of the town. 
Companies C and F waded through the deep snow toward the 
bunkers which had turned them back the previous night. Moving 
along the northwest road toward the junction at the western 
- 27 -
approach to the town, the battalions again met a furious hail of 
fire about five hundred yards from the defending emplacements. 
This was of the same pattern as that received the night before-
88mm fire from three directions, automatic weapons from the bun-
kers, and small arms from dug in positions around the pillboxes. 
Slowly they moved forward, inching their way through the snow, 
and attempted to reduce the fortifications with well-aimed ba-
zooka fire. This p roved successful with all but one of the bunkers, 
whose two foot thick walls merely ricocheted the rockets into the 
air. As a last resort, the tank destroyers were brought up; braving 
the dangerous 88's east of the town, these fired point 
blank through the thick walls of the bunker and rendered possible 
its capture by F Company men. 
At this point Companies A and C, greatly understrength from 
the battles of the last four days, joined with F for the final push 
into town. At 2400 we saw one of the most awe-inspiring scenes 
most of us can recall as eight battalions of artillery laid a con-
centration into Jebsheim which lasted for fifteen minutes. As we 
watched it seemed as if the village, laying peacefully asleep one 
moment, became nothing but a massive sheet of flame the next. 
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Ely 0100, January 27, Company F and the remnants of the First 
Battalion were on the northwest street of the town. Three hours 
later Jebsheim was clear to the upper square. In this engagement, 
which was extremely bitter while it lasted, G worked parallel to 
F along northwest street. The now exhausted men of F organized 
defensive positions in houses while G set up an arc 
facing north toward G russenheim. Since little activity was ob-
served in the southern part of the town, we believed that Jebs-
heim was clear except for snipers. 
G Company that afternoon, therefore, began the task of clear-
ing the north-south street . The unit soon discovered that our 
surmise had been far from right. After an intense battle which 
lasted all that day, G finally fought its way down to the lower 
square. The fighting was of the most severe type possible- house 
to house, floor to floor, room to room. Before the company had 
time to prepare proper defense at the lower square, a strong 
counterattack developed from the enemy position, and the 
depleted unit was driven back through sheer weight of numbers 
and fire power. The counterattack was finally repulsed at the 
upper square. 
The following morning, the 28th, the French desired to pass 
through the town, but failed in their attempt to break the Ger-
man lines. E Company then resumed the attack at 1400 to reduce 
resistance in the southern end of Jebsheim. Gaining ·impetus as 
the drive progressed smoothly and swiftly, the company was 
across the intersection and about five houses down on the left 
side of the street an hour later. 115 prisoners had been taken at 
the cost of only 26 killed or wounded . At about 1700 the enerrw 
launched another desperate counterattack, and as the company 
was slowly forced to give ground, G was committed to aid them. 
Together the two units repulsed the attack and made plans to 
continue the advance at 0400 the following morning, January 29. 
Just before the companies began their attack, three Germans 
entered our lines and asked Company E to surrender, saying, 
"We know you have only a company here and we have a bat-
talion." The men of E opened fire in answer and began the last, 
most bitter fight for the possession of Jebsheim. 
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The enemy was being supplied and reinforced by the road 
leading north into Jebsheim from Muntzenheim. To cut this road 
and to provide a base of fire for I striking Jebsheim from the 
south, the Third Battalion left its position in the Bois de Jebsheim 
at 1130 that day. Leaving K in reserve, I and L moved out along 
the road. Arriv ing at the bridge over the small creek, Company L 
turned south along the west bank to provide a base of fire for I 
Company, wh ich was to move southeast, by-pass the tip of Jebs-
heim, and, turning sharply north, strike the enemy in the vineyards 
just east of the German-occupied houses. 
Heavy fire from these houses caused a change in l 's operation ; 
a flank attack was decided upon. Accordingly, the unit moved in 
by the road leading west from the southern end of the town. A 
French tank encountered on the outskirts was persuaded to assist 
them and the newly formed tank-infantry team attacked enemy 
strongpoints on the west side of the north-south street. 
At the time of their arrival, the fight between the Second Bat-
talion and the enemy in his remaining houses was particularly 
violent. Compressing the Germans into these few houses below 
the southern square had necessitated the comm itment o f the 
remain ing elements of the First Battalion as well as the reserve 
company of the Second. From the houses, from the bunkers, and 
from the foxholes in the vineyards southeast of the street crossing, 
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the enemy resisted fiercely with automatic weapons while 88mm 
guns poured fire 'on the attackers. 
The impact of I, coupled with the blows being delivered by the 
Second Battalion, broke the German's desire to resist further. At 
about 1630 they began to march out of their foxholes, first in small 
groups of five and ten, then in larger groups, to surrender. The total 
was about 450, most of whom were members of 'the 136th Mountain 
Regiment. 
Jebsheim, itself, was now tak-
en. The cost had been high, but 
well worth the price we had paid 
for it. According to statements 
of prisoners of war, the town 
had been used as a corps 
headquarters. It was not until 
later that we learned that the 
Third Division had not expected 
us to be able to capture this 
stronghold . The question as to 
why our determination was so 
strong, our fighting so fierce, in 
taking this town was probably 
best answered by one Pfc who 
said, "If you think I was going 
to stay out in some damn foxhole 
full of snow while the Krauts were living in nice, warm cellars, 
you're crazy!" 
GGWATCH ON THE RHKNE99 
While the battle for Jebsheim was in its final stages, Company 
L, still on the banks of the little stream, was under heavy fire from 
the road leading south of town. In terrain which offered little 
concealment, L called for smoke; with the aid of this and strafing 
operations of the Army Air Corps along the road, the unit was 
released, and entered Jebsheim, now cleared. 
Company K was immediately assigned the mission of pushing 
southeast from Jebsheim, which they had entered by the Reidwihr-
Jebsheim road, attacking down the Muntzheim road, and securing 
the canal crossing just north of the latter town. The enemy still 
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resisted below Jebsheim and south of the canal, b.ut after mopping 
up the Germans left to fight delaying action, the company secured 
the bridge. F was sent southeast of town immediately after its fall, 
and held a line extending northwest from the canal crossing. 
The regiment spent the night of January 29th in defensive pos-
itions to the east and mortheast of town, with the exception of 
K along the canal and F extending north of the canal crossing. The 
following morning the First Battalion moved to • the line which 
Company F had held during the night. From this point the First, in 
conjunction with the French armor on the left flank, attacked east 
toward the Bois de Ia Hardt. Using A and B as a two company 
front, (these two units, with elements of D attached, had less than 
fifty men) the battalion advanced to the edge of the woods under 
small arms fire. Here the French were met by a heavy bar.rage of 
88mm guns emplaced in the woods; not wishing to risk their ar-
mor, the French withdrew and requested that the First Battalion 
draw back with them. They therefore returned to the line of de-
parture and went into defensive positions extending north from 
the canal. 
The attack on the Bois de Ia Hardt and eastward toward the 
canal junction was resumed on Februa ry 1. Having replaced the 
First Battalion on the line of .departure, the Third Battalion moved 
off at 0100 and advanced slowly against strong resisiance. Th is 
was eliminated only after I Company made a determined charge 
on the German positions and overran them. By 0730 the leading 
elements were through the forest and on the west bank of the 
Rhone Canal. 
A series of swift moves began the following day as the Colmar 
Pocket began to crumble. Early in the morning we received orders 
to establish blocks along the Rhine River from Artzenheim to Bies-
heim as the 7th Infantry uncovered the Rhine on its advance south. 
The Second Battalion was immediately alerted and at 0400 moved 
out to follow the 7th Infantry with the mission of protecting the 
rear and flank of that regiment while proceeding to outpost the 
Rhine from Artzenheim to the vicinity of Baltzenheim. Later this 
same day, the First Battalion moved to Kunheim and outposted 
the Rhine River from Baltzenheim to the vicinity east of Kunheim. 
The Third Battalion was assigned its holding sector from Biesheim 
north to the j unct ion of the Rhine-Rhone Canal. 
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These positions were held by the regiment until February 8th. 
During this time we occupied positions on the very banks of the 
Rhine River ; across this liquid barrier we could see mighty, for-
midable looking concrete pillboxes. Our stay here became known 
as the " Watch on the Rhine." Daily we wondered when the signal 
would be given for us to cross the boundary between France and 
the Nazi homeland. As we manned our positions under the glare 
of "artificial moonlight," we speculated as to the difficulty of 
making a successful bridgehead across this traditional bulwark of 
the German nation. Few of .us suspected how many miles and 
what bitter fighting lay between us and the day our crossing 
would be made. On the morning of the 9th we began a truck 
march to Montbronn where we were attached to the 100th Divi-
sion upon arrival. 
Thus ended our campaign in the Colmar Pocket. 
However, we were not forgotten. On the 13th of February we 
received a letter from Major General John W. O'Daniel, Com-
manding General of the Third Divis ion, which said, in part, "The 
Regiment has fought with outstanding gallantry and persever-
ance. The Third Division salutes all members of the 254th Infantry 
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as worthy comrades-In-arms. We are proud to have been associat-
ed with you and we regret your departure." 
Two days later, we were visited by Lieutenant General Alexan-
der Patch, Commanding the Seventh Army, who said he had come 
all the way to Montbronn to tell us that he was "mighty glad to 
have us." 
In six weeks the 254th Infantry had acquired a fine reputation. 
We meant to keep it in the months to come . 
• 34 • 
Chapter III 
~-
Si~gfried Line 
• 
• 
. _At 0050 on March 15 we were again tensely poised for the 
.7'l launching of another attack-the most important of our combat 
career. As we watched the artillery preparation, we recalled a 
few of the past events that had preceded this vital assignment. 
From the 8th of February until the 17th, we had remained attach-
ed to the 1 DOth Division in the vicinity of Montbronn, France as 
division reserve. Then, on the 17th, we received the orders we 
had been awaiting so long : intsruction to return to our parent 
unit, the 63rd Division. 
We reported to Willerwald, France, feeling rather like a prodigal 
son who has left home, done well in the world and learned much, 
but is glad to be back. Our experience· was immediately utilized 
as the First Battalion was attached to the 253d Infantry in the 
vicinity of Aursmacher, and the Second Battalion placed in divi-
sion reserve at Steinbacher Hof. (The Third Battalion had remained 
with the 1 DOth Division in St. Louis and did not return until the 
23rd of the month.) 
The last week o i February and 
the first two weeks of March the 
Regiment fought as a unit, main-
taining defensive positions north-
east of Sarreguimines and con-
ducting extensive patrols and 
raids. All during this time, . we • 
thought of the objective which 
someday awaited us : the breach-
ing of the mighty Siegfried Line 
which Dr. Goebbels had describ-
ed for so many years to the 
people of the world as "Ger-
many's impenetrable Westwall. " 
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And now, ten minutes before " H-hour," 0100, we realized how 
difficult was the task which confronted us. The enemy, in the 
preceding weeks, had been slbwly pushed back until he now 
occupied his last, most formidabl~ barrier. We knew that he would 
be determined to hold this at all costs. We knew, too, that the 
ground which lay before the Siegfried Line was also well de-
fended; trip wires, mines, and barbed wire criss-crossed the terri-
tory guarding these massive concrete structures, making a maze 
of deathly, easily defended barriers. 
Most of us felt strongly the responsibility of the confidence 
which had been placed in us. Two days before, the Corps had 
been assigned the mission of breaking the Siegfried Line in its 
sector. In conjunction with this, the 63rd Division had been given 
the task of making the initial attempt, and our regiment was 
chosen as the assault element. 
The p lan of attack had been skillfully prepared, and was easily 
divided into three phases - first, the uncovering of the ground 
stretching before the Siegfried Line by the First Battalion; 
second, the establishment and holding of a block by the Third 
Battalion; and third, the breaching of the Siegfried Line by the 
Second Battalion assisted by the First. 
The First Battalion was to strike with such speed and impetus 
that all outposts and fo rt i f ications ly ing before the Siegfried Line 
would be eliminated before the enemy had further time to in-
crease the effectiveness of these outer defenses. In this zone of 
aq;tion were three towns : Hartingshof, Eschringen, and Ensheim. 
At last 0100 arrived, the preparatory barrage ceased, and a 
great deal of tenseness which waiting always brings left as the 
First Battalion moved forward . C Company crossed the line of de-
parture just east of Bliesranbach and began to move out of the 
Hinterwald Woods just as a strong barrage of enemy art i llery 
opened fire. Thus, before the ,attack had fully begun, ten men 
were casualties . Nevertheless, within fifteen minutes the leading 
two platoons, abreast, had advanced nine hundred yards and 
reached the edge of the small fortif ied village of Ha rtingshof. 
This advance was so swift that the surprised enemy's rifle, 
automatic weapons, and mortar fire were ineffective. Advancing 
th rough a Schu-mine field, one platoon struck simultaneous ly 
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with the other. Immediately, the defenders called for an 
intense barrage of mortar, rocket, and artillery fire, ineffective to 
them in their concrete emplacments, although deadly to our ex-
posed attackers. This, coupled with the large volumne of automatic 
weapons fire pouring from the bunkers, provided a very bitter 
fight which lasted almost three hours. 
These reinforced positions were finally reduced by groups of 
C "buttoning up" the aperatures while others under this cover-
ing fire, assaulted the bunkers hurling grenades through the open-
ings. The company reorganized at 0400 to clear the surrounding 
woods; in doing this, the unit captured approximately fifty pris-
oners and forced the retreat of several German tanks by 
a·ccurate bazooka fire. 
While C was taking Hartingshof, A had slruck simultaneously at 
Eschringen. Like the other two rifle companies, this unit had a 
platoon of heavy machine guns and a section of 81 mm mortars 
attached from D and with this group moved through a minefield 
soon after leaving the cover of the Hinterwald Woods. By being 
extremely cautious, the company was able to penetrate this with 
only two casualties. 
It was of vital importance that the two bridges in the town be 
taken intact to allow the armor which would follow later to cross 
without delay. In view of this fact, 
A decided to strike each of 
these structures at the same time 
with one platoon. After taking 
the bridges, the platoons were 
to expand their gains, using the 
original objective as a center 
of operations. 
About half way to Eschringen, a 
distance of little more than a mile, 
they encountered barbed wire en-
tanglements booby-trapped with 
S-mines. After cutting a narrow 
path and passing through this in 
single file, the company deploy-
ed for the attack. Immediately 
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after the race to the bridges began, machine gun and small arms 
fire issued from the windows of many of the houses in the town. 
Nevertheless, both spans were quickly secured and the demo-
lition wires cut to the large mines beneath them before the 
enemy was able to discharge them. In expanding their hold upon 
the town, A met fierce resistance which lasted only a short time, 
however. After capturing the town, it was necessary to send a 
platoon to one of the hills surrounding it in order to eliminate the 
shelling the unit was receiving from 88mm guns emplaced there. 
Eschringen was then outposted following the sucessful completion 
of this mission. 
While A and C Companies were initially fighting for Eschringen 
and Hartingshof, respectively, B prepared to follow A as ?Oon as 
that organization had cleared Eschringen sufficiently for B to pass 
through on its route to attack Ensheim. Thirty minutes after "H-hour," 
the unit crossed the line of departure and followed the route that 
A had taken. When the company arrived in Eschringen, the men 
found that the attackers had already taken the bridges and were 
in the process of clearing the town. Since speed was essential, 
they passed through the town immediately and started for their 
objective. However, in the darkness and under the fire of a 
heavy barrage, the company mistook the road leading into Om-
mersheim for the one to Ensheim. 
After advancing approximately five hundred yards on this 
highway, the company encountered an anti-tank gun emplaced 
in the middle of the road and well defended by infantrymen 
dug in around it. After a hard fight, with several casualties from 
the fire of the gun, B eliminated this obstacle and proceeded 
toward its objective. The advance was slow, however, for a 
series of saw-tooth trenches ran parallel to each side of the 
road; the enemy fought a delaying action from these. 
Finally, they entered the outskirts of the village and after 
another difficult fight, in which large quantities of German artil -
lery were poured at them, the company was able to occupy most 
of the houses in the western part of town. It was from these 
that they were able to drive off the numerous counterattacks 
that came until dawn. Both the company and the artillery radio 
ilad been destroyed during the fight into the village, so it was im-
possible to call for artillery support. Only the weapons of the 
company, itself, could be used in dispersing the counterattacks. 
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just before dawn the company realized that it had taken the 
wrong road and was now in Neumuhlerhof instead of Ensheim ; 
two volunteers, therefore, started back· to Battalion Headquart-
ers at Eschringen with this message just before the largest and 
most vicious of all the counterattacks struck. This was beaten off 
at the cost of most of the company's remaining ammunition. 
When these messengers reached their destination, at about 
0700, the First Battalion had already realized the error that B 
had made. However, the battalion had already reached a point 
a I most a thousand yards in front of the unit to its right, and an 
attack on Ensheim would increase this to two thousand yards, 
leaving a greatly exposed right flank. Although B had made a 
tactical mistake, their position was strategically good, for it pro-
tected the otherwise vulnerable right flank. Therefore, the mes-
sage was sent back to the company in Neumuhlerhof to hold and 
secure the ground they had taken until the unit in whose sector 
they were relieved them . 
C arrived in Eschringen, after having cleared out all oppos-
ition north of Hartingshof, at about 0730 and received the order 
to attack Ensheim. After a short reconnaissance, the company 
decided to move up the draw slightly to the east of Ensheim 
and strike the southeastern part of !he town. At the same time, 
a platoon of tanks would move up the road between the two 
towns and fan out in the fields before the objective to support 
C with direct fire. 
As the company began moving forward, they met an enemy 
counterattack which was in the process of forming in this same 
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draw. The enemy, surpris-
ed, was completely routed, 
although a heavy artillery 
barrage began falling from 
the high ground to the 
northeast. At 0100, after 
friendly artillery had si -
lenced the German guns, 
the attack was resumed. 
The attached tanks opened up at point blank range on the 
houses C was attacking in one of the finest examples of infantry-
team cooperation that the regiment has ever witnessed. Although 
the initial resistance was very heavy from small arms and panzer-
fausten fire, the accuracy of the friendly tanks soon enabled the 
company to gain the foothold it needed in the southern part of 
town. 
All morning this bitter fighting raged, as the enemy resisted 
from house to house; the Germans seemed determined that the 
price for Ensheim should be high. At 1330, A Company was also 
thrown into the desperate fight against the Nazis. Massive Ger-
man Tiger Tanks delivered devastating fire at both of the units 
as well as the attached armor, but eventually were forced to 
retreat to the protection of the Siegfried Line as the Volksgrena-
diers supporting them were slowly eliminated by the men of the 
First Battalion. 
As darkness fell, the town was ours. All of us realized that the 
First Battalion had done an excellent job, and we resolved that 
we would uphold the example they had set. The stage was now 
set for the Third Battalion to begin its attack. In the early morning 
hours, this unit began arriving in Ensheim. 
Very little was actually known about the Siegfried Line, as 
ground reconnaisance had been impossible; no one had ever tried 
to test the strength of the pillboxes which composed this sup-
posedly finest of all static lines. Some things, however were 
known. We know that prior to our attack the enemy had with-
drawn the bulk of his artillery and rocket projectors as well as 
men and other materiel to these fortifications. We were well 
oriented, also, on the fact that the line was designed to stop an 
attacker by its horizontal depth rather than by vertical depth, 
such as the Maginot Line. Intelligence had informed us that the 
p illboxes which . studded the ridges in th~ area relied on inter-
locking fire by small groups of six or seven emplacements to 
mutually support each other and stop any attacker even as many 
as half of them were reduced. In addition to this, the ground be-
tween the emplacements was honey-combed with a network of fire 
and communication trenches which would probably be used be-
fore it became necessary to retreat to the cover of the concrete 
structures. 
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The terrain of this area wa's such that the only avenues of ap-
proach were over exposed slb.pes uAder direct enemy observation 
from the left, front, and right Between Ensheim and Bishmisheim 
the defenses were based on the commanding ridges which over-
looked all avenues leading north from Ensheim. The line at this 
point consisted of three belfs, with the third containing most of 
the artillery, mortar, and rocket emplacements. 
-r~e~-a-~~~~ ~~ 
PO~ 
It was the task o~ f.ne Third Battalion to sleze a strongly de-
fended hill in the Si~~fl'iEild and block the lin-e on the Division left 
flank. This unit was to act as a hinge on which the door to the 
Siegfried Line would be opened; If this hinge did not hold, the 
line could not be pierced with the rapidity which was desired. 
Therefore, the Third Battalion had two missions: to gain the initial 
fortifications, and to hold these positions at all costs. 
The approach march began at 0400, under a fairly heavy barrage 
concentrated on the entire Siegfri'ed Line; this was designed to 
be so light that the enemy would not expect an attack, yet intense 
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enough to serve as a screening tactic. The line of approach fol-
lowed the main highway toward the Siegfried until it reached a 
small unimproved road which branched off to the west. After 
traversing this for several hundred yards, a cross-country route was 
taken to avoid the possibility of the roads becoming impact areas 
in case the attack was detected. 
Daylight found the battalion assembled in the draw below the 
hill which was to be assaulted. While the companies deployed in 
the draw, a slight skirmish took place between scouts and the 
enemy in open emplacements. A hasty reconnaisance was ' then 
made and the three pillboxes which guarded the southeastern 
slope of the hill were chosen as the most propitious for the initial 
assault. 
K was designated the assault company, and it was decided to 
use the platoon of heavy machine guns attached to that unH from 
M with the organic lights to neutralize the pillboxes by making 
them close their aperatures. All guns would open up together at 
1041, K would then rush the fortification as soon as they were 
neutralized. 
The machine guns and two platoons of the assault element had 
just crossed the draw ready to deploy for the attack when sud-
denly it seemed as if all the fire which lay in the deep bellies of 
these mighty fortresses belched forth at once. The din of the 
artillery, mortar, and rocket fire was so tremendous that only 
occasionally could the staccato sound of the many machine guns 
in each pillbox be heard. This fire was so intense that one platoon 
of K found it impossible to cross the draw and join the remainder 
of the company. 
Nevertheless, the attack began on schedule as the machine guns 
commenced their fire at the designated time on the pillboxes 
selected for the assault. It soon became apparent that the apera-
tures could never be completely "buttoned up" by a concentration 
of automatic weapons. Therefore, K, bolstered by assault 
squads from I and L Companies, began its onslaught into the 
cones of fire to reduce the enemy by whatever means were 
available. 
In this in itial phase of the reduction of the pillboxes each of 
the three assaulting groups could only experiment with methods 
for the elimination of the emplacements and those within. Bazooka 
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teams braved all types of fire to stand up and use their charges 
against the heavy steel doors which guarded the entrance to the 
pillboxes. They watched, disappointed, as they saw the ineffect-
iveness of their rockets against the steel which far exceeded in 
depth the penetrability of their weapon. Men crawled within fif-
teen or twenty feet of the steel sheilds which protected the em-
brasures to fire antitank grenades which had no effect other than 
concussion. Others, with satchel charges, worked their way slowly 
and laboriously toward the pillboxes in order to place the·ir ex-
plosives at the huge steel doors. Again, the results were the 
same. 
Finally, one or two men volunteered to work their way to the 
roofs of the emplacements they were attempting to smash. Here 
each of these successful enough to gain the top found a ven-
tilation shaft jutting from the top of the structure. First, ordinary 
fragmentation grenades were dropped down the small hatches; 
at least one of these men was wounded as all found that these 
charges merely rolled through a trap door only to explode in the 
open beside the p_illbox. 
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The assault groups tried again. Two methods were at last found 
which drove the defenders from their huge emplacements. One 
group suspended a bangalore torpedo from the top of the pillbox 
down the ventilation pipe and :detonated it. The great concussion 
caused by this explosion wound'ed or stunned those inside the 
structure and caused them to op~n their doors and surrender. 
The other two groups used a more dangerous, although just as 
effective, method. The machine gun fire which kept the aperatures 
closed was lifted. When the Germans opened these in order to 
fire their guns, they found either ,a white phosphorous or a !hermite 
grenade thrown at them by a,man pressed against the side of the 
pillbox next to the aperature. The burns sustained by t~e defend-
ers were so severe that they, to.o, surrendered in order to receive 
medical care. 
That afternoon, at 1530, under the heavy artillery, mortar, and 
rocket barrage which was directed at our troops, the last of the 
seven pillboxes which studded the hill was taken. The two com-
panies which were at the foot of the hill awaiting its capture 
had also been subjected to extremely heavy rocket, mortar, and 
artillery fire during this period. The ground in which it was nec-
essary for these units of the Third Battalion to dig their foxholes 
was extremely wet. Water seeped in almost as fast is it could be 
bailed out. 
I and L Companies were brought to the crest of the hill in a 
mopping up operation to eliminate some remaining r~sistance by 
snipers. Meanwhile, K had reorganized and at 1600 moved out 
toward Hill 386 in accordance with the original plan. The Opera-
tions Instructions had called for two companies to secure hills on 
an arc to the northeast as the remainder of the battalion advanc-
ed to the St. Ingber! Highway upon the completion of the breach-
ing of the pillboxes which had just been taken. However, a few 
minutes after K had left for its objective, the battalion was order-
ed to "cease further offensive action." 
It was at this time that we completely realized in what a pre-
carious position was the Third Battslion. No unit was abreast 
on either the right or left. The nearest troops on the right flank 
were 2000 yards behind, in Ensheim. The left flank had its support 
even further back. Therefore, the enemy could concentrate all his 
strength against this one battalion to eject it from the line. With 
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three sides exposed, offensive act ion against the unit would b e 
a _simple matter. It was scare ly feasible that reinforcements could 
,\ be brought from the vic inity of Ensheim, for the deep draws that 
surrounded the hill were und er excellent observation and mur-
derous fire. 
A patrol from I ·company was fired upon by advance elements 
of a strong counterattack and in a few minutes the entire bat-
talion, which had hardly had time to adequately outpost its defense, 
was engaged in an effort to drive this off. After a stiff fight, in 
which many of the Germans infiltrated to within a few yards of 
the battalion 's line by means of the communication trenches which 
stetched all along the Westwall, the enemy withdrew that night 
under the cover of darkness. 
By the time the message " cease further offensive action" had 
been received, however, K had already departed for its desti-
nation, meeting only light artillery resistance. Although an effort 
was made to contact the company, both the unit's radio as well 
as the artillery radio with the Forward Observer failed to operate. 
The,~company had just teached its destination and begun to dig 
in when a counterattack, supported by artillery, hit them from 
c_,.-_.. -·--~ 
the _ north, east, and west. The fight which ensued was of an in-
tense nature, K suffered heavy casualties due to the fact that 
there had been insufficient time to prepare adequate defensive 
positions. Despite these casualties the attack was broken up 
shortly after dark, although attempts were made that night to 
infiltrate our lines. 
Just after dawn the artillery radio was repaired and the mess-
age received, "Have King and friends come in tactically." This 
order, coupled with the sounds of heavy shelling, convinced the 
company that the battalion was sustaining another counterattack, 
the message was therefore interpreted to mean that K would 
have to fight its way back. At the time the withdrawal began 
another counterattack struck from the north; an artillery barrage 
was immediately placed on their recently vacated position to act 
as a screen. 
So heavy had been the casualties during the hectic night that 
one entire platoon was used to carry the wounded between 
the two assaulting platoons. As K came within sight of the 
battalion area they found their premise to be correct : the 
battalion was engaging a large number of Germans. Unnoticed, 
the company moved within fifty yards of those who were at-
tacking the l ines of I _Company. When K reached the absolute 
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mm1mum safety range between our artillery and themselves, they 
had the curtain of fire lifted and assaulted the bewildered enemy. 
The result of this one assault, by actual count, was seventy enemy 
killed. 
Shortly after K had been assigned a sector in the perimeter de-
fense, a patrol of platoon size sent to look for any remaining 
wounded intercepted a German major with a small group of men. 
The capture was easily made, and in an immediate interrogation 
the officer admitted that an even stonger counterattack was sche-
duled for that afternoon. Soon after this information had been 
disseminated, the enemy again struck in what seemed a last fana-
tical attempt to retake the hill. It was only after an hour and a 
half of very bitter fighting that these forces were turned back, 
with an estimated loss of fifty percent of the three hundred and 
fifty engaged in the attack. 
This proved to be the last of the attempts by a~tack to regain 
the vital block the Third Battalion had established. Nevertheless, 
for the following two days and nights, the hill remained a virtual 
holocaust as the Germans began firing every available weapon in 
an attempt to drive the battalion from the hill through sheer fire 
power. 210 and 150mm artillery crashed into the soft earth with 
explosions that shook the emplacements and filled the air for a 
few seconds with hundreds of deathly steel splinters. High velocity 
shells from 88 and 75mm guns smashed into the sides of the pill-
boxes and blended with sounds of the multi-sized mortar and 
fire-tailed rockets also crashing into the hill. 
Never before had any unit in the regiment taken such a sus-
tained, high pitched barrage. But the Third Battalion took all that 
the enemy had to give, knowing that every, shell thrown at them 
was one less with which the units making the breakthrough would 
have to contend. The block had been made and would be held. 
THJE BREAKTHROUGH 
The rest of us in the regiment, feeling as helpless as a cheering 
section in a football game, watched the magnificent fight the 
Third Battalion staged to take the vital hill which would serve as 
as block for our operations. Ensheim., lightly but persistently 
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shelled, was the scene of continuous activity as we prepared to 
strike the line with all our weight as soon as the block was firmly 
established. Casualties poured into ready aid stations when 
darkness permitted the evacuation of the wounded from the hill. 
Once again we marvelled at the speed and efficiency with which 
each case was treated by the medics, then sped to the rear toward 
an evacuation hospital. Somehow, each of us felt a bit more 
confident as we realized the care and swift attention we would 
receive if our luck momentarily deserted us. 
From the better vantage points in Ensheim we could see, on 
this spring-like day, the entire line spread before us. The long 
belts of dragon's teeth, row after row as far as the eye could see, 
added to the formidable picture of hundreds of massive grey 
pillboxes commanding every hill, every slope. In contrast to the 
partially covered route the Third Battalion had been able to 
employ, the only approach to the fortification which guarded the 
main highway we must neutralize for the armor was through 
open ground, affording almost no cover. We knew that there was 
only one way the reduction of this maze of steel and concrete 
could be made - by moving straight into all the fire they could 
throw at us, take our casualties as they came, and reduce the 
pillboxes one by one. 
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Although the attack to smash the fortifications which guarded 
the Ensheim-St. lngbert Highway was originally to start soon after 
dawn, the heavy counterattack that the Third Battalion was sus-
taining made necessary a postponement until this could be re-
pulsed. However, the Second. Battalion had already moved from 
the positions it had obtained by following the Third Battalion the 
previous day. These were almost due north of Ensheim at an 
approximate distance of a thousand yards along the unimproved 
road running somewhat parallel to the highway. Shortly after 0800 
the Battalion was in an assembly area five hundred yards 
southeast of the blocking position. Not until they had received 
word that the counterattack .. had been repulsed did the Second 
move into the long-awaited attack. 
E, assigned the position of assault element, was followed by 
G, while F remained in the assembly area as battalion rese rve. 
Due north was the direction of the attack as shells and long range 
machine gun fire rained on the attackers in an attempt to stop the 
group before it reached the vicinity of the pillboxes which were 
to be struck. Even under this intense fire and irregardless of the 
fanatical effort of the defenders to hold their g round, E was 
able to level two bunkers and capture two pillboxes by noon. 
This was accomplished despite the fact that one platoon had 
been pinned down by very effective f ire from one of the emplace-
ments. The other two nevertheless swing to the left to attempt the 
reduction of three large pillboxes on the left side of the road . 
After a savage fight which featured a long, uphill crawl by several 
men who braved the artillery and automatic weapons fire to 
throw thermite grenades into the opened aperatures of the em-
placements, this group of fortifications was eliminated and the 
entire company moved southward in an attempt to take from the 
rear the positions which were protecting the dragon's teeth . 
G, meanwhile, had also been commited to attack northward and 
take the group of pillboxes in the draw to the west of the high-
way; Just as G was coming abreast of E at 1800, a large armor-
supported counterattack struck from the direction of the draw to 
the east. Although the company saw the large body of Germans 
coming behind the deep line of tanks, it was impossible to get 
artillery on the attackers because the radio was temporarily out 
of order. (There is good reason for our maxim, " The radio always 
works - exept when you need it the most! " ) 
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A few minutes later, G was engaged in the most caustic battle 
of its entire career. Our men were determined that they would not 
withdraw from the ground which held the pillboxes gained at the 
cost of many comrades' lives and shattered hopes. To be forced 
to give way at this time would mean that each yard, each trench, 
each fortification would have to be purchased again for the 
bloody price which had already been paid. E, directly behind G, 
was in a position that made it impossible to lend much support to 
efforts to staunch the drive of the two enemy infantry companies 
aided by two platoons of tanks. It was impossible to comm it f be-
cause that unit was being very effectively pinned down by 
streams of fire from the emplacements which commanded the 
draw. 
G managed to do the only thing which prevented its complete 
eradication - closed on the enemy so that the Germans could 
not call artillery for fear of annihilating their own unit. Our attach· 
ed tank destroyers and tanks valiantly engaged the enemy's armor 
in a long range duel, keeping the German high velocity guns off 
us. For two hours the company was able to stave off attack after 
attack as all available ammunition was rushed from the other units 
in the battalion. At last, around 2000, so much had been expended 
that the situation became acute. The withdrawal order came a11d 
the depleted company, following the rest of the batta lion, slowly 
pulled back to the positions it had occupied the night before 
along the unimproved road running parallel to the main highway. 
Spirits were very low as we realized that all of the progress we 
had made that day had gone for nought. It was not until a reor-
ganization began in E Company about midnght that it was dis-
covered that eighteen men had been left in pillboxes the unit 
had taken. We hardly dared hope that there was d possibility that 
these comrades still held the emplacements. In the confusion that 
is always the keynote of battle, no one was sure how many of the 
eighteen were wounded; we only knew that some of the men had 
been left to guard and aid those who had fallen until evacuation 
could be safely effected. The demands which the counterattack 
made on us at the time of the withdrawal had driven all remem-
brance of them from our brain . 
Early the following morning, two squads were sent from E to 
guard the litter bearers on their approach to the pillboxes with 
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the further mission of defending the fortifications if we still occu-
pied them. When this group reached the emplacements, they 
found all eighteen men, ten of whom were wounded, still it1 
posS'ession. The casualties were carried back to "Weasels" parked 
along the road held by the Second Battalion. That afternoon a 
platoon from G relieved the two squads in the three pillboxes. 
Two task forces were organized in conjunction with plans for 
the Second to continue the attack that day. Task Force Number 
One, consisting of a platoon from A, a platoon of tanks and a platoon 
of tank destroyers, was to guard a team of engineers as they 
prepared a crossing of the mined ground in front of the dragon's 
teeth. Moving out at about 1500, the task force moved along the 
highway north of Ensheim, the Ensheim-Stankelkapchen road, to 
take covered positions north of these tank barriers and provide 
protection from either an armored or infantry attack. Very little 
resistance was met until the group was within two hundred 
yards of their objective. Here they were pinned down by artillery 
and automatic weapons fire. Nevertheless, the mission was ac-
complished by 1930. 
Task Force Number Two, which was composed of one platoon 
each of Company A, of tanks, and of tank destroyers, was to 
attack and take the small village of Ensheimer Hof. After leav-
ing Ensheim at 1430, the task force headed through Gehrle woods 
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and Kirkelbach Creek to their destination, which was captured 
a hour and a half later under only light artillery resistance. The 
tanks and tank destroyers then returned to Ensheim while the 
infantry platoon outposted the town. 
Once again the Second Battalion threw itself into the attack at 
1630 that afternoon with F in the assault. Once again it seemed as 
if every gun in this mighty defense opened up as the defenders 
showed their determination to stop any advance. Using tank 
destroyers and tanks to full advantage, the company managed 
to reduce three of the large fortifications in the sector as well 
as several smaller ones. This was accomplished in the most de-
vastating fire under which any unit of the regiment had ever 
fought. The exl")austed state of those in the Second Battalion forc-
ed the ceasing of this offensive soon after dark. Again we 
noticed the phenomena which never fails to surprise men in 
battle: one may fight almost indefinitely without feeling fatigue, 
but as soon as he allowed to rest, all the exertion he has ex-
pended seems to fall on him at once, and he drops into a deep 
sleep. 
The following morning the attack was resumed with F still the 
assault element. Although the first two pillboxes were taken 
with very little resistance, the enemy suddenly seemed, to 
realize that this day must be his last, most desperate attempt 
to stop the invader. For ten straight hours, from 1000 to 2000, we 
received the most intense shelling in our entire combat experi-
ence. Every weapon in that sector of the Siegfr ,ed Line was 
trained on us in a saturation 
I 
bombardment which consisted of 
every size German weapon -
small, medium, and large mortar, 
light and heavy artillery, high 
velocity anti-tank guns, and all 
sized rockets were unleashed in 
a fury of explosion and fire. 
During all of this, F supported 
by the remainder of the Second 
as well as by tank destroyers 
and tanks, took a total of eigh· 
teen pillboxes. 
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C Company had also been committed with the m1ss1on of 
clearing the fortifications east of the crossroads. Just before 
midnight of this day, the 19th, the last pillboxes which guarded 
the highway were eliminated. In addition to capturing these 
boxes, C took prisoner almost and entire company as well as a 
battalion commander. The way was now clear for the mighty 
armor to be unleashed into the Rhine Valley. 
The 254th Infantry was the first unit in the Seventh Army to blast 
a path through the Siegfried Line. In five days we had cracked a 
defense which had taken seven years to build, had drained 
the financial resources of the nation that built it, and had been 
called by many of the world's leading military strategiests "im-
penetrable." · 
Although the highway was free of opposition, there still remain-
ed some fortifications in our regimental sector to clear. F Com-
pany, therefore, continued to thee east and by 0400 had taken seven 
more pillboxes and captured the Germans who manned them. 
Two hours later the Second and Third Battalions were alerted for 
early offensive action as the armor rumbled through. At this same 
time Company A sent a platoon sized combat patrol to Ober 
Wurtzbach; two hours later this town had fallen after light resi-
stance, and the unit captured forty prisoners. At 0900 the remain-
ing two platoons of A reconnoitered the twelve pillboxes which 
remained untaken in our sector. Each of these was found deserted. 
That afternoon, as we waited to move through the defense we 
had broken, we watched the tanks roar past us, cutting deeper 
into the Nazi homeland. We realized then that the heavy price we 
had paid had not been too high. The world was one big day 
closer to peace. 
After we had read the telegram sent us that morning, "Congrat-
ulations from the officers and men of the Third Infantry Division," 
we wearily started through the gap we had made. We wondered 
what new task lay ahead of us. Whatever it could be, we some-
how knew that we would be able to do it. 
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Chapter IV 
/ he Siegfried Line had been breached; as troops and equipment 
~ began to pour through the hole we had made, a new problem 
presented itself throughout the Seventh Army front: the enemy 
must now be sought in order that he be completely defeated. The 
situation was fluid. There were no more definite German lines 
just as there were no longer any static friendly ones. For a week 
the only uniformed enemy we saw were the those who raised 
their hands high over their heads at our approach. 
For the first time we saw entire towns and villages fully peopl-
ed with the "Master Race." The population, for the most part, 
seemed dazed as we would enter a town, contact the Burgo-
meister, and requisition the best homes for ourselves. There were 
always a few who would greet us with broad smiles and enthus-
iastic waves and another few who could not disguise the hate 
which burned in their eyes and glowed in their faces. The great 
- 55 -
. ... ·-
majority were so deferential that their attitude approached servi-
lity as they lavished us with food and liquor. 
We found that the famous German schnapps, which they seemed 
to enjoy so much, tasted to us like an unholy combination of 
gasoline, kerosene, and ether, with just a dash of quinine. The 
beer was little better; instead of the thick, heavy brown liquid 
we had expected, we were given only a light amber substance 
which tasted as bitter as our Halazoned water. Only the cognac, 
vermouth, and recaptured French wines met with the approval of 
the those who enjoyed the pleasure of the bottle. 
Perhaps we were most amazed at the clothing these poeple 
wore. A stroll down the main artery of Neunkirchen or Mitfei-
Bexbach (the street was probably named Adolf Hitler StraBe -
every town had one) on Sunday afternoon seemed little different 
than a similiar promenade along Main Street in Peoria or Hoboken. 
Women wore well-cut woolen suits or dresses, silk stockings, and 
silly hats; furcoats were no more uncommon than in the States. 
Only the well-worn shoes indicated that Germany had been 
waging war for seven years. There were no young men; only 
boys and old men represented the male population. The young-
sters had shed their leather week-day shorts and wore knickers 
with soft shirts and sport coats. The men dressed just as all old 
men dress - conservatively, in blue or gray or black. 
In sharp contrast to the excellent ga rments afforded by the 
natives was the clothing worn 
by the DP's, or Displaced Per-
sons. These unfortunates, who 
had been taken from their home-
lands by the German war mach-
ine to relieve the critical man-
power shortage which total mo-
bilization had caused, had been 
treated on a par with our slaves 
in American Colonial Days. Indi-
vidual treatment varied with the 
respecti ve " owners," but even 
those who were well fed w ere 
extremely i ll -c lad. 
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As we rolled deeper into Germany, the roads became more and 
more clogged as these people fled from those who had enslaved 
them. Nothing seemed important except traveling as for and as 
fast as possible toward the i r native lands each day. French, Bel-
gians, and Dutch hurried westwa rd walking, bicycling, or pushing 
baby carraiges and carts ; Poles, Slavs, and Russians fled east-
ward with their miserable possessions strapped on their backs 
or piled in wagons. We enjoyed many cups of black coffee be-
cause we knew that the condensed milk which came in our 
"1 0-in-1 " rations had gone to feed a t iny Pol ish baby whose 
starved mother was unable to feed it . We tc.,ok clothing, warm 
clothing, from the houses of the Germans to give i t to those who 
were once again returning to life. 
In southern Germany we found that the people were very de-
vout, went to church regularly, and refused to work on the Sab-
bath. We could never reconcile these Nazi homes filled with 
religous paintings and books. Across the room from a copy of 
" The Last Supper" was sure to be a photograph of Der Fuhrer; in 
the bookshelves, " Mein Kampf" would rest beside the Bible. 
Most of the homes in this terr i tory were new with all modern 
conveniences. In the farm villages, many of the houses were 
heated with steam, had electric stoves, and beautiful furniture ; 
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even the poor possessed new, expensive looking furnishings. 
Germany had done well in her systematic rape and loot of Europe. 
Looting was strictly forbidden, but cameras, field glasses, and 
pistols seemed tci appear everywhere. Our corner meetings 
began to sound like a convention of the National Photographers 
Guild as focal lengths, depth of focus, the relative merits of 
Scheiner and Din tests, and the advantages of Leica over Contax 
became the center of discussion . 
. We were never able to stay away from the children - even 
German children- and we soon learned what they meant by asking 
for "Cowgoomie." As we handred over a stick we might say 
something about "these darn Kraut kids," but they got the gum. 
It did not take us long to realize that the average German was 
a bewildered person. All his sense of moral values and his phi-
losophy of life were fashioned by the deluge of propaganda that 
had characterized life under the Nazi regime. Now everything he 
had been told to believe in- mainly Power and the Invincibility 
of th_e Wehrmacht - was being swept away by the surge of the 
allied armies sweeping into his homeland. In his hour of need, 
there was nothing to which he could turn. Religion, while out-
wardly a strong influence in his life, had been so subjugated to 
the stronger demands of the Nazi party that it could not now 
take the place of that dominant feature of ech German's life. 
Education had become only a refined tool of Nazi propadanda. 
For the time being, at least, they could see no hope of salvation; 
everywhere we went we heard them say, "Alles, a lies kaput. " 
Sixty-five miles and eight days after we had blasted a path 
through the Siegfried we were again on the banks of the Rhine. 
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As we rode on a pontoon bridge across this traditionally sacred 
stream, we could see in the distance the flash of big guns 
denoting that once again the German Wehrmacht was attempting 
to form some sort of a static line. 
It soon became apparent to all of us exactly what they were 
attempting to do. By leaving small groups of their best troops, 
bolstered by the SS, they hoped to purchase, even at the cost 
of complete annihilation of these delaying groups, the essential 
time it would take to form somewhere a line defense. 
Speed became as essential to us as time to them. So hard and 
so swiftly must we hit these holding troops that it would be im-
possible for the main body of Germans to again organize an 
effective defensive stand. So fierce and so sustained must be 
their fight that enough time would be gained to eventually 
stop us. 
· The troops we met, for the most part, were of the most fana-
tical type possible. They relied on the superior fire power of 
automatic weapons to supplant their lack of men. The partial 
success of these tactics is well attested by the fact that ·in the 
month of April, we had almost one hundred more battle casual -
ties than in March. Almost twice as many men were killed in action 
than during the entire month when we hit the Siegfried Line! 
We found, however, that the soldier had greatly changed since 
the days he fought in France or even in the Siegfried Line. Al-
ways before he had fought until there was no chance of win-
ning, and then had withdrawn, if possible, or surrendered if not. 
Now the enemy was divided into two groups: those who fought 
fanatically for the Fatherland, willing to die for their Nazi beliefs, 
and those who saw that further resistance was futile and surrend-
ered readily, even giving at times valuable information to help 
stop the useless destruction of lives, homes, and property. 
Different than any other combat period we had ever experienc-
ed, there could never be any rest, any let down in alertness. None 
of us knew just where the enemY. was. We would pass through 
two or three towns without encountering a single soldier; then, 
without warning, the fourth would be fanatically defended and 
we would have to fight hour after hour in order to enter some 
small village. Continually we moved. Day after day and night after 
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night the advance continued southward; we must not give them 
time to form another defensive line! We had to keep moving 
even though we were so exhausted that no longer anything seem-
ed important except rest and sleep. And still the Germans fought 
for time. 
For the first time we felt the shocking impact of rear guard 
tactics. In our onrush, we would fail to uncover small pockets of 
German soldiers who would play havoc with our supply routes and 
communication paths until it became necessary to dispatch large 
numbers of our own troops to flush them from their hiding places. 
In addition, it was impossible to maintain proper liaison be-
tween our own units and even neighboring regiments because of 
the rapidity of our advance. When a town was approached by 
elements of a front line unit, the group was often uncertain as to 
whether or not the town had been taken. Many villages were 
captured by a single jeep taking the wrong road; l"fl.~ ny men 
were reported missing when a wrong turn led them to a defend-
ed town. At times a company would suddenly find itself five to 
ten miles ahead of any adjacent organization; if the enemy realiz-
ed this, he would strike, and another bloody battle would ensue. 
It became apparent about the middle of April that the Germans 
were attempting to reorganize on the banks of the Danube River, and 
our headlong drive became known as the "Race for the Danube." 
At times it looked as if we .were going to lose that race. Our 
path was well marked with the bodies of our fallen comrades. 
There are places along this route that we shall · never forget: 
Hoherot, Osterburken, Krautheim, the Jagst River, Dorzbach, ln-
gelfingen, the Kocher, Kunzelsau, Rublingen, Jungholzhausen, and 
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Schwabisch Hall . There are other places, too-many of them 
among the 125 towns we took-that a single sniper will never 
let us forget. During this "complete rout" of which the headlines 
screamed, we received more than 600 replacements. 
On the 24th of April, we realized that we were within a day 
of the Danube. A fast shuttling system which we had been using 
for several days had sped our progress considerably . . Late that 
evening the •:=irst Battalion, which was the assault element, uncovered 
a strong enemy pocket at Gerstetten and were engaged in clear-
ing that town when a message was received from Battery B of 
the 862d Field Artillery that they were being attacked by a com-
pany of German infantry. C Company was immediately motorized 
and moved quickly by truck to the town of Hinchstitten where 
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they routed the enemy unit. It was a great pleasure, they said, 
to come to the aid of those who had always supported us when 
our own position was precarious. 
Advancing very swiftly under no resistance the next day, the 
First Battalion arrived in Reidheim on the northern bank of the 
Danube at 1500 on the 25th. Amazed, they discovered that the 
bridge was still intact. Immediately troops began to pour across 
under sporadic machine gun and artillery fire. However, only one 
platoon of A had made its way over the structure and into the 
town of Leipheim on the other side when a flag was waved from 
the church tower and the bridge was blown. Immediately, this 
one platoon began to receive very heavy fire from automatic 
weapons emplaced in build ings all along the main street of the 
town. 
Fortunately, however, the demolition job had not been thorough, 
and the other two platoons of A were able to lay boards 
across the uprights under the protection of a strong base of fire 
built by the remainder of the battalion. Nevertheless, it took some 
time to obtain the material for the ramp and to correctly place 
it on the uprights while under fire, and for an hour and a half 
the one platoon across the river held alone a tiny bridgehead in 
this last, desperate bulwark of the once "invincible" Wehrmacht. 
At last, around 1630, all of Company A managed to cross the 
makeshift bridge, and two hours later the rest of the battalion 
was also in Leipheim. Only a few minutes after the town was 
lightly outposted, and while the houses were sti ll being searched 
for snipers, a counterattack struck from the direction of the air-
port to the southeast. Two companies and three tanks smashed 
into the left flank of the town, which was being defended by 
8 Company, and after two hours of intensive fighting, in which 
the enemy inflicted twenty-four casualties on that unit alone, the 
attack ·shifted to the part of town being held by A Company. 
The en~my was well supported with two and four barrelled 
88mm anti-aircraft guns which they leveled at the town in a bar-
rage which approached the intensity of that received in the 
Siegfried Line. All artillery within range was called in an effort 
to turn back the attackers; the Second Battalion was brought 
from Reidheim, and finished crossing the Danube at about 2200. 
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Two hours later, after suffering many casualties, the regiment 
drove the Germans from the town. 
Once more the enemy struck, this time at dawn the next day. Even 
larger numbers of German troops poured from the vicinity of the 
airfield. This time we were better prepared, and the full impetus 
of the attack was never allowed to reach the town, although 
small groups of Germans managed to fight their way into Leip-
heim. This attack was also broken up; actually, the retreat of the 
enemy became almost a rout, with the result that our two day 
prisoner count was swelled to 698, the largest of any like period 
in our history. 
For the first time since we had been committed on the 1st day 
of January, we were pulled off the line for a rest. We were to 
guard targets in the vicinity of Rothenburg, Germany. Our combat 
days in Europe were over. For two weeks we listened to the radio 
and waited for 'the news we knew was sure to come. No longer 
did we hear the roar of the artillery, the death rattle of the burp 
gun, the crack of the sniper's bullet. 
On a day like any other day we heard the news that was flashed all 
over the world. For a brief moment we were intoxicated with the 
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joy of the thing of which we had so· long dreamed. And then we 
remembered. We remembered Colmar and Leipheim and all the 
rivers and the woods and the streams and the towns and the 
men who lay between. We remembered another city and we 
wondered what rivers and what woods and what streams and 
what towns and what men lay between. 
On June 15, 1945, just two years after our activation, we received 
the word that the Regiment had completed its work; it was to go 
back to the United States for deactivation. Most of us did not 
have enough "points" for discharge, so we would be scattered 
throughout other units in Germany. 
Following this announcement was one which made· us all very 
proud : we had been awarded the highest honor an organization 
may receive, the Presidential Unit Citation. As long as we were in 
the army, wherever we went, all of us would wear pinned on 
our right breast, by itself, a royal blue ribbon rimmed with gold. 
But many of us would carry forever, where it could never be re-
moved, the pride of having built the 254th Infantry Regiment. 
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G ENERAL ORDERS 
No. 44 
SECTION XIII 
WAR DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 6 June 1945 
2. As authorized by Ex ecutive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul. 22, 1943). 
superseding Ex ecutive Order 9075 (sec. Ill , WD Bul. 11 , 1942, the foll -
owing unit is cited by the War Department for outstanding performance 
o f duty in action during the period indicated , under the provisions of 
section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the name of the President of the 
United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. 
The citation reads as follows: 
The 3d Infantry Division with the following attached units : 
2541h Infantry Regiment, 
99th Chemical Battalion, 
168\h Chemical Smoke Generator Company_ 
451st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion , 
661sl Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP). 
756th Tank Battalion, 
IPW Team 183,. 
Fighting incessantly, from 22 January to 6 February 1945, in heavy snow 
storms, through enemy-infested mar~hes and. v:oo~s. a~d over a flat 
plain crisscrossed by numerous small canals , rrngatron drtches, and un-
fordable streams terrain· ideally suited to the defense, breached the 
German defense 'wall on the northern perimeter of the Colmar bridge-
head and drove forward to isolate Colmar from the Rhine. Crossing the 
Fecht River from Guemar, Alsace , by stealth during the late hours of 
darkness of 22 January, the assault elements fought their way forward 
against mounting resistance. Reaching the Ill River, a bridge was thrown 
across but collapsed before a.rmor could pass to the support of two 
Battalions of the 30th Infantry on the far side. Isolated and attack by 
a full German Panzer Brigade, outnumbered and outgunned, these 
valiant troops were forced back yard by yard. Wave after wave of 
armor and infantry was hurled against them but despite hopeless odds 
the regiment he ld tenaciously to its bridgehead. Driving forwa rd in 
knee-deep snow . which masked acres of densely sown mines , the 3d 
Infantry Division fought from house to house and street to street in 
the fortress towns of the Alsatian plain. Under furious concentrations 
of supporting fire, assault troops crossed the Colmar Canal in rubber 
boats during the night of 29 January. Driving relentlessly forward , six 
towns were captured withing 8 hours, 500 casualties inflicted on the 
enemy . during the day, and large quantities of booty siezed . Slashing 
through to the Rhone-Rhine Canal, the garrison at Colmar was cut off 
a~~ !he fall of the city assured . Shifting the direction of the attack, the 
drvrsron moved south between the Rhone-Rhine Canal and the Rhine 
towar~ Neuf Brisa~h and the Brisach Bridge. Synchronizing the attack, 
the brrdge was se rzed and Neuf Brisach captured by crossing the pro-
tectrng moat and scalrng the medieval walls by ladder. In one of the 
h?r~<;>st foug_ht and bloodiest campaigns of the war, the 3d Infantry 
Drvrsron annrhrlaled three enemy divisions, partially destroyed three 
others,. captured over 4,000 prisonners, and inflicted more than 7,500 
casualtres on the enemy. 
By order of the Secretary ·at War: 
Official: 
J. A. UL\0 
Major General 
The Adjutant General 
G. C. MARSHALL 
Chief of Staff 
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